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LABOR AND THE LAW*
R BEIT S. Spmm.Ax, JR.**
Labor's weapon, the most potent and at times the most devastating in the economic arsenal, is its right to strike. There was
a time under the common law when the strike, even if peaceably
pursued, was not canonized as it is to-day. The right of the in'
dividual to quit has always been recognized as a fundamental personal right. But to quit in. concert with others pursuant to agreement for the purpose of producing injury or destruction to the
trade or business of another, aihd thus to compel the employer to
submit to the demands of his employees, was held until recently
in England and at an early day in some of our states to involve an
unlawful conspiracy which carried not only liability in the civil
courts but penalty and punishment for violation of the criminal
law.
It took the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, passed
by Parliament in 1875, to establish conclusively in England the
principle that a strike conducted without unlawful acts is not
punishable as a crime.' Although in this country for more than
a century juries have generally refused to convict members of
labor organizations as conspirators guilty of committing a crime,
the American courts have applied to the acts of labor unions the
English common law of conspiracy as the basis of recovery of
damages against unions and their members and of granting in* Address delivered before the Logan County Bar Association on October
15, 1937.
** Member of the bar of Kanawha County, West Virginia.
I This act provided that a combination by two or more persons to do any act
in furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if
such act committed by one person would not be punishable as a crime.
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junctions against strikes. However, as early as 1842 the Massachusetts court, in a celebrated case still frequently referred to, speaking by Chief Justice Shaw, not only recognized that an association
of laborers for the purpose of advancing their common trade interest was not illegal, but went so far as to hold in effect that the
purpose of the combination to enforce a closed shop did not make
it unlawful. 2 The case arose under indictments for common law
conspiracies. The principal point ruled, after a review of all the
principal English and American decisions, is thus stated in one of
the headnotes:
"An indictment alleged that the defendants, being
journeymen boot-makers, unlawfully &c. confederated and
formed themselves into a club, and agreed together not to work
for any master boot-maker or other person, who should employ any journeyman, or other workman, who should not be
a member of said club, after notice given to such master or
other person to discharge such workman. HeldZ, that there
was no sufficient averment of any unlawful purpose or means."
Thus at this early day the principle was announced, which still
obtains, that the legality of the combination depends upon its
motives and the means used to carry its purposes into effect.
The principles announced by Chief Justice Shaw in the Hunt
case came to be accepted by most of the courts of this country. It
is noteworthy that it required no statute here, as it did in England,
to establish the doctrine that a labor union is not per so unlawful
as a common law conspiracy, and that concerted cessation of work
by the employees of any employer, i.e., a strike, for the purpose of
compelling recognition of the demands of the union, if these are
not contrary to established law, constitutes no breach of the law,
civil or criminal, provided, of course, the strike be lawfully conducted without breach of the peace or injury to property.
Labor's right to bargain collectively through its chosen representatives and its rights to enforce its demands by striking when
less drastic means fail, is now firmly established and recognized by
employers, the public, and the courts, state and federal. But this
right of strike is not without qualification.$
2 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Mete. 111 (Mass. 1842).
8 The English Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927 declares that
cc.... any strike is illegal if it (1) has any object other than or in addition
to the furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the
strikers are engaged; and (2) is a strike designed or calculated to coerce the
government either directly or by inflicting hardship upon the community."
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TATIONS UPON THE IGHT TO STRIXE

1.

Sympathetic Strikes

One limitation upon the use of the strike, generally recognized in most jurisdictions including the Supreme Court of the
United States, is that if the purpose of the strike is to injure an
employer of labor with whom the organization has no trade dispute,
the strike is illegal. Thus it is generally held that sympathetic
strikes are an illegal interference with the rights of others. The
underlying principle was well stated by the Massachusetts court
(which, as above stated, was one of the earliest of our courts to
recognize the right to strike) in a case in which the court said that
the strike involved had an element in it. like that of a sympathetic
strike, a boycott or a black listing:
"..... In our opinion organized labor's right of coercion
and compulsion is limited to strikes against persons with
whom the organization has a trade dispute; or to put it in
another way, we are of opinion that-a strike against A, with
whom the strikers have no trade dispute, to compel A to force
B to yield to the strikers' demands, is an unjustifiable interference with the right of A to pursue his calling as he thinks
best."i
Closely allied to the sympathetic strike is the boycott. The
landmark in the law of boycotts is the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the DanburyHatters cases. In Loewe
v. Lawlor, (which grew out of the notorious Danbury Hatters
strike) the Supreme Court held that a combination to boycott
plaintiff's interstate trade in hats was within the scope of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, for violation of which the defendants were
later held liable for threefold damages under Section 7 of that Act
in Lawlor v.Loewe,6 in a unanimous opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes.
A storm of protest from the heads of the great labor organizations arose because of this decision. Organized labor was powerful enough to secure the passage of the Clayton Amendment to the
Sherman Act, the avowed purpose of which was to nullify the
It amends the picketing provision of former acts by making picketing unlawful
where persons attend in such numbers or act in such manner as to be calculated to intimidate any person in the house or place being picketed or to
obstruct entrance to the house or place being picketed or to lead to a breach

of the peace.

(Italics supplied.)

&Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 587, 78 N. E. 753 (1906).

G2O8 U. S. 274, 28 S. Ot. 301 (1908).
6 235 U. S. 522, 35 S. Ct. 170 (1915).
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decision and to place labor organizations beyond the reach of the
anti-trust laws,-a pious purpose which failed of accomplishment,
as the Supreme Court in the American Steel Foundries case,' and
others following it, held that the Clayton Amendment assumed a
strike for lawful ends conducted by lawful means and that it furnished no immunity to striking labor organizations to destroy
property or breach the peace, as will hereafter be noted.
2. Strikes in Employments Affected by the Public Interest
Another limitation now generally recognizbd is that the character of the service affects the right to strike, and that where the
employment is "affected with a public interest," limitations are
per se imposed which do not obtain in private employments. One
of the early cases in which the question was considered is Arthur v.
Oakes,8 in which Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting as a circuit judge of the
seventh circuit, held that in the absence of legislation to the contrary, the right of one in the service of a quasi-public corporation
-the Northern Pacific Railroad Company-to withdraw from sucb
service at such time as he sees fit, must be deemed so far absolute
that no court of equity will compel him against his will to remain
in such service, notwithstanding the fact that such quitting shows
a reckless disregard of his contract of employment and the convenience and interests of both employer and the public. The
learned justice further held, however, that any combination or
conspiracy upon the part of employees would be illegal the object
of which was to cripple the property of the railroad or embarrass
its operation, either by rendering the property unfit for use or by
using wrongful methods to cause employees to quit or to prevent
or deter others from entering the service in place of those leaving
it; and that a combination or conspiracy between two or more
persons to accomplish such purpose is unlawful and in proper case
may be enjoined. The court refused to consider whether the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act were applicable, and rested
its decision "upon the general principles that control the exercise
of jurisdiction by courts of equity." 9
7

American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.

184, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921).

8 63 Fed. 310 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894).
9 The court adopts the definition of a strike given by Sir James Hannen in
Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B. 602 (1869): "I am, however, of opinion that
strikes are not necessarily illegal. A strike is properly defined as 'a simultaneous cessation of work on the part of the workmen,' and its legality or illegality
must depend on the means by which it is enforced, and on its objects."
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The reason that an exception is recognized in the case of employment affected with a public interest is, of course, that in such
employments not only the rights of the employer and the employees
but also the paramount rights of the public are involved. The
great opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for a unanimous
court in the D ebs case, still stands a bulwark for the protection of
the public right. The case grew out of a strike of the employees
of the Pullman Palace Car Company in Chicago. An injunction
was granted by the lower court restraining the striking defendants
from interfering with the business of any of the railroads as common carriers of passengers and freight between the states, or obstructing mail or express trains, and from attempting to induce
or compel employees of any of the railroads to refuse or fail to
perform their duties. Mr. Justice Brewer answered the contention
of immunity of the strikers from interference by injunction in
vigorous terms:
"....
If a State, with its recognized powers of sovereignty
is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce, can it be that any
mere voluntary association of individuals within the limits of
that State has a power which the State itself does not
possess? "'0

The same principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in
upholding the Adamson Eight-Hour Act in Wilson v. New," in
Pesident Wilson's day, where the majority held that whatever
may be the right of employees engaged in private business by
concert of action to agree with others to leave their employment
in the event their demands are not granted, "such rights are necessarily subject to limitation when employment is accepted in a business charged with the public interest," namely, the running of the
railway systems of the country. The Solicitor General, John W.
Davis, argued that power was inherent in Congress to regulate not
only hours of service of employees engaged in interstate commerce,
but also to regulate and settle disputes as to rate of wages between
the carriers and their laborers, which, if not regulated by Congress,
would leave the public helpless. Chief Justice White, delivering
the majority opinion, wrote:
"We are of opinion that the reasons stated conclusively
establish that from the point of view of inherent power the
act which is before us was clearly within the legislative power
10 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 581, 15 S. Ct. 900 (1895).

1243 U. S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298 (1917).
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of Congress to adopt, and that in substance and effect it
amounted to an exertion of its authority under the circumstances disclosed to compulsorily arbitrate the dispute between
the parties by establishing as to the subject matter of that
dispute a legislative standard of wages operative and binding
as a matter of law upon the parties . . . . " (Justices Day,
Pitney, Van Devanter and McReynolds dissenting.)12
The Boston police strike bf i919 furnished a historic application of limitation imposed upon the right to strike by the public
nature of the employment. It will be recalled on that occasion
Calvin Coolidge, then Governor of Massachusetts, in a telegram
to Samuel Gompers, then President of the American Federation
of Labor, announced in language that received the endorsement of
the country, "There is no right to strike against the public safety
by anybody at any time anywhere."
While President Wilson was able to avert threatened railroad
strikes in 1916 by urging the passage of the Adamson Eight-Hour
Law for railway employees, he was not so fortunate in dealing
with the United Mine Workers of America. This powerful organization in the latter part of 1919, notwithstanding the existence of
wage contracts made in 1917, to run until the end of the war but
not beyond April 1, 1920, demanded wage increases upon the
ground that the contracts had terminated notwithstanding the continuance of a technical state of war. The operators refused the
demands of the union. Thereupon the union officials called a
nation-wide strike for the first of November. This was enjoined at
the direction of the President by the Attorney General of the
United States in the United States District Court at Indianapolis.
he situation was succinctly stated in a letter written by President
Wilson to Mr. Robinson on December 19, 1919, appointing him a
member of the Bituminous Coal Commission, created for the purpose of settling the strike. After referring to the unavailing
efforts made through the Secretary of Labor to induce the union
officials to keep its members at work pending arbitration, the President said:
" .... on October 25, 1919, I issued a statement in which
I said that a strike in the circumstances therein described 'is
not only unjustifiable, it is unlawful.' Despite my urgent
appeals that the men remain at work, the officers of the United
Mine Workers of America rejected all the proposals for a
12 Id.

at 351.

(Italics supplied.)
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peaceful and ordinary adjustment and declared that the strike
would go on. Accordingly, at my direction, the Attorney
General ified a bill in equity in the United States District
Court at Indianapolis, praying for an injunction to restrain
the officers of the United Mine Workers of America from
doing any act in furtherance of the strike. A restraining
order was issued by the court, followed by a writ of temporary injunction on November 8, 1919, in which the defendants
were commanded to cancel and revoke the strike orders theretofore issued. These strike orders were accordingly revoked
in a form approved by the court, but the men did not return
to work in sufficiently large numbers to bring about a production of coal anywhere approaching normal"
The strike continued despite the injunction of Judge Anderson. The officials and leaders of the United Mine Workers were
summoned to appear before Judge Anderson at Indianapolis on
December 9th in answer to rules charging them with contempt of
that court in not obeying its order to stop the strike. On December 6th, three days before the date for the hearing of the contempt
charges, an agreement was made between A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General of the United States, and John L. Lewis, President
of the United Mine Workers of America, with the approval of
President Wilson, for the return of the miners to work with a
fourteen per cent increase in wages and the appointment of a commission to consider further questions relating to wages, working
conditions, profits and prices.
Time does not permit discussion of the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1927 in the twelve
cases that went up from the District Court of the United States
for the Southern District of West Virginia in which injunctions
against the United Mine Workers of America were sustained, restraining it, its officers and members from interfering with the business of the 316 coal companies then operating on a non-union basis
in Southern West Virginia, on the ground that such interference
was pursuant to a conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade in
violation of the Sherman Act.' 8 These injunctions were the aftermath of the notorious armed marches on Logan in September, 1919,
and August, 1921. Althought the Supreme Court of the United
States refused certiorarito review the opinion of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, few decisions of recent years
18 International Organization of United Mine Workers of America v. Red
Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C.C. A. 4th, 1927); certiorari

denied, 275 U. S. 536, 48 S. Ct. 31 (1927).
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have been the subject of more abuse by labor leaders and politicians, wholly unjustified, than this one. In every congressional
investigation of the labor situation since, the record has contained
references to the "yellow dog contract" upheld by this opinion
and the restraints which it imposed upon the right to strike. Acts
of Congress have been specifically leveled against it. In fact, the
decision of the circuit court in the Red Jacket cases went no further
than the Supreme Court had gone in the Hitchman case, 1 ' the
Coronado cases 11 and other decisions, as evidenced by its refusal
to grant certiorari.
FEDERAL LAws PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE

The Clayton Act of 191416 amended the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act by providing that labor organizations should not "be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
The Clayton Act also forbade
trade under the anti-trust laws."
issuance of injunctions by the federal courts "in any case between
an employer and employees" to prevent employees from ceasing
work, whether singly or in concert, from peaceably persuading
others to abstain from working, from "ceasing to patronize or employ" (conducting boycotts), and from doing other acts which
might lawfully be done in the absence of a labor dispute. A proviso in the law permitted injunctions to prevent irreparable injury to property rights for which there was no adequate remedy
at law. Construing the act, the Supreme Court held that it introduced no new principle, but was merely declaratory of what has
always been the best practice in the federal courts controlling the
granting of injunctions, and that it still left jurisdiction in such
courts to restrain strikes which attempted by violence or threats
17
of injury to life or property to enforce the demands of labor.
Dissatisfaction of labor with the operation of the Clayton Act
led to the enactment in 1932 of the more drastic Norris-La Guardia
Anti-Injunction Act. 8 This act, after declaring the public policy
of the United States in labor matters, in terms invalidated contracts of employment by which the employee agreed not to join
14 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 S. Ct. 65 (1917).
15 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570

(1921), and 268 U. S. 295, 45 S. Ct. 551 (1925).
16 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 9 F. C. A. Tit. 29, § 52.
17 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.

184, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921).

i847 STAT. 70 (1932), 9 F. C. A. Tit. 29, §§ 101-115.
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any labor organization, or to "withdraP' if he became a member.
It destroyed jurisdiction in any court of the United States to
enjoin the doing of enumerated acts growing out of any labor dispute, including the "ceasing or refusing to perform any work or
to remain in any relation of employment." It limited the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue injunctions in cases growing
out of labor disputes to those where it appeared, after hearing the
testimony of witnesses in open court and findings of fact by the
court, that the unlawful acts threatened will be continued unless
restrained, with the result that substantial and irreparable injury
to complainant's property will follow; that greater injury will be
inflicted upon complainant by denial of relief than will be inflicted
upon defendants by the granting of relief; that complainant has
no adequate remedy at law; and that the public officers charged
with the duty of protecting complainant's property are unwilling
or unable to furnish adequate protection.
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 9 declared in terms the right of employees to organize and to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, but did
not, like its successor, the National Labor Relations Act,20 expressly
recognize the right to strike.
It may be mentioned in passing that the Bituminous Coal
Act of 193721 (Guffey-Vinson Act), while omitting the labor provisions that caused the downfall of the original Guffey Act of 1935,
contains in Section 9 a declaration of the public policy of the
United States which includes the right of mine workers to bargain
collectively, denies to coal producers the right to discharge or discriminate against employees for the exercise of such rights, and
provides that no employee shall be required as a condition of employment to join any association for collective bargaining in the
management of which the producer has any share of direction or
control.
The influence of labor in the halls of Congress, indicated by
the provisions of the Acts to which reference has been made,
culminated in the National Labor Relations Act, more familiarly
known as the Wagner Act, of July 5, 1934.22 Time and your
patience will not permit a review of its provisions. It was ably
i948 STAT. 198 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 707.
20 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 9 P. C. A. Tit. 29, § 151.
2150 STAT. 72 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 828 et seq.
22 49 STAT. 449 (1935); 9 F. C. A. Tit. 29, §§ 151 et seq.
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discussed in the paper read by Harry H. Byrer at the last annual
meeting of the West Virginia Bar Association at White Sulphur
Springs n September 17, 1937.8 The provision of the Wagner
Act of interest in the present connection is its definite recognition
and even encouragement of the strike as a weapon of industrial
warfare. Section 13, consisting of only two lines, provides:
"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed so as to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to
strike."
Unlike the Railway Labor Act,2 4 which provides machinery
for the purpose of avoiding industrial conflict by means of conference, conciliation, mediation and voluntary conference, the National Labor Relations Act makes no provision for the protection
of the rights or interests of employers, but in terms encourages
and in practice promotes resort to the strike.
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL

LABoa REL&TIoNs

ACT

There has been extensive criticism, both in Congress and in
the press of the country, of the partisan attitude of the National
Labor Relations Board created by the Act. The charge has been
made that the Board and its trial examiners have not acted as impartial judges of disputes between employers and employees'
unions, but rather as prosecutors of employers. Senator Nye is
reported to have said that the Board had "such a pronounced pro-C. I. 0. basis that the average man regards it
as an adjunct."' 2 5 Any open-minded man must concede there is
fair room for criticism. The great power asserted by the Board
was illustrated recently by its opinion in the National Electric
Products Corporation case in Pennsylvania. 28 The district court
of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania had
decreed that a contract between the corporation and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, an affiliate of the
American Federation of Labor, was valid and had ordered the
corporation specifically to perform it. Subsequently, upon a complaint filed with the Board by the United Electrical and Radio
Workers of America, an affiliate of the C. I. 0., charging that the
corporation was engaging in. unfair labor practices in its perform23 Byrer, The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relationsd
At Comparison (1937) 44 W. VA. L. Q. 1.
24 48 STAT. 1185 et seq. (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 151 et seq.
25 Editorial, The Labor Board Disposes, N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1937.
a CCH Labor Law Service, Par. 21, 532 (4).
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ance of this contract, the Board held that the Wagner Act gave it
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of the contract,
and that the decree of the district court was no bar to the Board's
exercising such jurisdiction or to the making of an order by the
Board invalidating the contract. The Board ordered the corporation to post immediate notice to its employees that the corporation's contract with the Brotherhood "is void and of no effect,"
and ordered an election among the employees to determine whether
the Brotherhood or the rival C. I. 0. affiliate should represent the
employees in dealing with the employer. This, it is submitted, is
an arrogation of power never asserted by any other board or commission created under an Act of Congress. Neither the Interstate
Commerce Commission nor the Federal Trade Commission nor any
other creature of the legislative department of the national government has, so far as I ]mow, asserted power to disregard and override the judgments of the courts.
But more important than the question whether the Board and
its trial examiners are performing their duties under the Wagner
Act in a judicial or an arbitrary spirit, is the question whether the
terms of the Act itself are such as to make possible a judicial consideration of its problems by the Labor Board, or whether the Act
does not by its very nature make a partisan attitude inevitable.
It has been pointed out that the only "unfair labor practices"
listed in the act are practices by employers. No act of the unions
is declared to be an unfair labor practice. It is unfair practice for
employers not merely to coerce but even to "encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." But if a union
resorts to intimidation of no matter how flagrant a character in
order to induce membership therein, the Labor Board is not authorized by the act to take cognizance of the matter. In short, while
it can find an employer guilty of violating the act, it can neither
try nor sentence a union or its members.
The Wagner Act is essentially a punitive statute. Under the
procedure which it establishes, the Board and its agents become
not only judges but investigators and prosecutors,--as pointed out
by Mr. Byrer.
It is easy to understand why the act has failed of its purpose
to promote industrial peace, if indeed this was its purpose. There
are others besides Senator Nye who believe it was passed to further
the interests and strengthen the hand of the Committee for In-
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dustrial Organization, headed by John L. Lewis. The recent strikes
in the steel industry give point to the argument. In a late article
by George Sokolsky27 the author states that he has it on good
authority that since the C.I.O. came into existence, coal miners
have paid into the C. I. 0. in dues and special assessments a total of
$7,000,000, which has been employed to finance strikes in industries other thaOn coal. An interesting commentary on present labor
legislation is that while it is a felony to move strike breakers from
one state to another, there is no restriction upon the similar movement of pickets and labor agitators.28 In fact, it appears that
many of the most active fomenters of recent strikes have been inhabitants of states other than that in which the strikes occurred
and members of unions representing trades different from that in
which the striking employees are engaged. Thus many of the most
active participants in the recent steel strikes were members of the
United Mine Workers of America.
A side-light upon the reason underlying the demand of Mr.
Lewis for a written agreement with the steel industry is supplied
by Mr. Sokolsky. He points out that the written agreements demanded by Lewis with all the dozen steel companies involved were
to expire on February 28, 1938. (It is to be remembered that
while the Wagner Act calls for collective bargaining, it does not
call for a written or signed agreement.) The steel men asserted
that John L. Lewis was seeking to produce in steel a condition
that already exists in coal,-where all wage agreements terminate
on a certain day, and a general strike in the entire industry can
be, and has repeatedly been, called if the agreements are not renewed on his terms. Thus Lewis would hold the whip-hand year
after year in steel as in coal. This would place him in a strategic
position to demand the check-off from the 500,000 workers in the
steel industry. At $12 a year, not counting initiation fees and
special assessments, this would give the C. I. 0. $6,000,000 a year
to finance strikes and further strengthen its organization. 9
There can be no industrial peace under federal statutes which
make this state of affairs possible. This is so evident that already amendments to the Wagner Act have been suggested by
economists and publicists who have studied the situation. It is
27 Soko]sky, THE C. I.

0.

TURNS A PAGE

(Sept. 1937) 160

ATLANTIC MONTHLY

309.

28 Act of June 24, 1936, c. 746, 18 U. S. C. A. 407a.

29 Sokolsky, supra n. 27.
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obvious that the responsibility of the worker as well as of the employer must be recognized and enforced. In June of this year
Senator Vandenberg offered in the United States Senate three
simple amendments to the Wagner Act, the propriety of which
cannot reasonably be questioned. The substance of the Vandenberg amendments was to make it an unfair labor practice for any
person (1) to engage in any strike unless the strike had been voted
by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit for collective
bargaining; (2) to engage in any strike for the purpose of inducing any person to violate a contract or any law of a state or of
the United States; (3) to interfere with the free exercise of any
right or privilege secured by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States. Unions found guilty of violating these provisions
would be forbidden to collect dues, assessments or contributions
during a specified period. The Vandenberg amendments were
not passed by Congress. Clearly, they do not go far enough to
meet the existing situation.
Other provisions which nearly all fair-minded students of
the subject agree should be incorporated into our federal labor
legislation, either by amendment of the Wagner Act or by the
passage of a new act dealing with the subject, include the following:
1. The incorporation of labor organizations. With the immense power which they exercise, there should go a measure of
responsibility, which can best be accomplished by incorporation
under a charter setting forth the rights and obligations of the
union.
2. That labor organizations be required to render annual
statements of their accounts in such shape that the union members
as well as the public may know how its funds are spent.
3. That contributions for political purposes should be made
public and should be unlawful unless authorized by at least a majority of the membership of the union.
4. That it be made an unfair labor practice for any organization to coerce or intimidate any employee into joining or refusing to join any labor organization.
5. The "peaceful picketing" legalized by Section 20 of the
Clayton Act of 1914 and enlarged by the Norris-La Guardia Act
of 1932 should be limited, as it has been in England," so as to
so Supra n. 3.
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make picketing unlawful where the pickets attend in such numbers
or act in such manner as to be calculated to intimidate those in
possession of the place being picketed or to obstruct entrance thereto or to lead to a breach of the peace.
Above all, the alien practice recently imported from France
and applied effectively in the automobile and steel strikes, known
as the sit-down strike, should be branded as an unfair labor practice
and made punishable by statute as the trespass which it clearly is.
With a word as to the grave problem presented by the sitdown strike, which challenges deliberate consideration of the lawyers of the country, I am through. It is a remarkable fact that the
sit-down strike has found in high place not only its apologists but
its advocates. It is not surprising that a writer of communistic
slant, like Louis Adami, should express the view that "The
weapon should be sharpened by the C. I. 0. and used fully." Nor
is it remarkable that a director of the C. I. 0. like John Brophy,
or that the periodicals published by the labor unions should give
such tactics a more or less qualified approval. But what does arrest
attention is such a statement as that made on January 26, 1937,
by the Secretary of Labor, Miss Perkins, that "The legality of the
sit-down strike has yet to be determined." Still more strange, to
lawyers, is the view expressed by James M. Landis in an address
before the Harvard Club of Boston on March 17, 1937, who, after
conceding that the sit-down strike "finds itself with doubtful traditional legal justification," said:
"The eventual outcome of such a claim will depend in
part upon the emphasis that law will give to the concept of
property and its inviolability in its industrial and corporate
setting to economic pressure of.this type, and in part, perhaps,
on the capacity of our law to devise new concepts and mechanisms to meet the needs out of which this type of economic
pressure has been born."'3
The gentleman who thus closed his eyes to the construction which
the courts, since Magna Carta, have given to constitutional and
legislative guaranties of property, both in England and this country, was then chairman of the Federal Securities and Exchange
Commission and is now Dean of the Harvard Law School.
Henry T. Hunt, counsel of the National Resources Committee,
is reported of the opinion that the law on the subject of sit-down
s'Landis, Control of the Sit-down Strike (1937) 1
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strikes is in a state of emergence and "it is too simple just to say
that a sit-down strike is illegal and let it go at that."I 2 And we
find another schoolman, Leon Green, Dean of the Northwestern
University School of Law, recently announcing that the sit-down
strikers, if they refrain from fraud and violence, 'are not tres'3
passers, but remain "employees with all their relations intact.
Since no authority tending to sustain the legality of the sit-down
type of trespass can be found in our common law jurisprudence,
it is a not unreasonable inference that its advocates rely upon
Russian precedents.
On the other hand, there has been a much more accurate and
open appraisal of the situation by labor itself. Thus, John Frey,
head of the Metal Trades Department of the A. F. of L., in February, 1937, after pointing out that the deadly menace of the sit-down
strike, not only to employers but to organized labor, lies in the
power which it gives an organized minority to impose its will upon
the majority of the workmen employed in any plant or in any industry, soundly said:
"The theory and practice of the so-called militant minority has the hall-mark of Moscow and was imported from Russia.
"The sit-down strike and the control of labor policy by a
militant minority are deliberately intended to destroy selfgovernment by trade unions and set aside the principles of
democratic self-government upon which the American trade
union movement has been built up." 3 4
And Senator Borah, upon the floor of the Senate, in reply to Mr.
Landis' statement above referred to, said:
"I suppose it is dangerous to prophesy as to what legal
concept eventually will be imposed in our system of legal
jurisprudence, but I cannot conceive of any legal concepts
which would make legal a sit-down strike. " 35
Representative Sumners of Texas, the able Democratic Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, said in the same connection:
"If there should be a development of that sort, it would
only be as a part of a period of governmental and economic
anarchy."
at 246.
Ibid.
84 IXd.at 238.
a2 Id.
B3

a5 Id. at 240.
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No lawyer will doubt for a moment the accuracy of the statement of the law made by Dean Dinwoodey that "under well settled
principles of property law, the employer has a legally protected
right to the exclusive possession of his factory or plant, just as
the householder has to the exclusive possession of his home," and
that "although a person may have lawfully entered upon another's
property, if he remains after the owner requests him to leave, he
is a trespasser under the rules of law governing the defense of
property from wrongful intrusion.'"'3 As Senator King put it in
a speech in the Senate on March 17, 1937, strikers who hold the
property of another for the purpose of compelling him to grant
their demand as a condition of surrendering that which is his, are
plainly guilty of extortion: "They have, in effect, kidnapped a
3
plant, and hold it for ransom. " 1
Such is settled law in West Virginia. Our court in Angel v.
Black Band Consolidated Coal & Coke Co.,8 8 held in construing the
usual rental contract between a coal company and its employees,
that when the employee ceases to work for the company (strikes), his
right to occupy the company house also ceases, and if he remains
in possession after demand therefor, he becomes a trespasser and
the landlord has the right to reenter and remove his goods without
legal process where this is done without violence or a breach of the
peace. And it has never been doubted that the employer is entitled to prompt and effective orders of the courts, backed by the
full power of the state, to compel restoration of possession where
the trespasser resorts to force or violence.
In West Virginia, as in most states, trespass is made by statute
a criminal as well as a civil offense. Our courts are committed to
the proposition that a continuing trespass may be enjoined, and
it is, of course, familiar law that the trespasser is liable at law for
the damages caused by his unlawful act. In the suits which grew
out of the occupation of the automobile factories in Detroit in
March of this year, little argument or pretense was submitted by
counsel for the strikers that their possession of the plants and
factories of their employers was lawful. In the Chrysler case,
Judge Campbell on March 15th, in considering the argument that
the automible companies had violated the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and the answering contention that the
so Dinwoodey, N. Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1937.
87
88

(1937) 1 EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 239.
96 W. Va. 47, 122 S. E. 274 (1924).
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act was unconstitutional, refused to pass upon its constitutionality,
holding that "If it is valid, it can hardly be contended that failure
to abide by its terms gives the defendants the right to seize and
appropriate $50,000,000 worth of property of the plaintiff and to
prevent by threats of violence any use of the property by the plaintiff or its agents."
The question which arrests our attention as lawyers is not
any doubt as to the legality of the sit-down strike. That it is
illegal, by any standards with which we are familiar, is beyond
fair debate. What vitally concerns us is a much deeper question
than this, a much more ominous one than the necessity for amending our labor laws. The thing that imperils us is the defiant disregard by that large body of labor for which the C. I. 0. speaks
of the statutes and laws which we now have and of the decrees
of the courts of the land made for the purpose of enforcing them.
Remember that evacuation of the Chrysler plants at Detroit in
March, 1937, by the 6,000 sit-down strikers who held them under
orders from the C. I. 0., was not made pursuant to the orders of
the state courts requiring immediate surrender of the plants by
the strikers and delivery of possession thereof to their owners, but
only upon the order of John L. Lewis, Chairman of the Committee
for Industrial Organization, not issued until Mr. Chrysler, as the
price of it, had agreed with Mir. Lewis that no attempt would be
made by the owners to operate their plants and no machinery would
be moved out of them for operation elsewhere pending the conclusion of negotiations for settlement of the strike. The mild disapproval of the President of the United States, expressed in the words
of the dying Mercutio---"A plague on both your houses"-brought
from M r. Lewis stern reproof in terms which reminded the President that joint disapproval of both strikers and employers ill
became one who had experienced the hospitality of labor's house
and supped at labor's table.
Great power is a strong draught and labor has drunk deep
of it in recent days. The result is that its leaders have been afflicted with a vertigo of omnipotence which has frightened politicians and dazed the public. In this turmoil it is imperative-as
it has been more than once before-that the lawyers and the judges
of the country be neither terrorized nor confused. Regardless of
political affiliations, irrespective of economic views, uninfluenced
by the nature of individual practice, the bar can hold no traffic
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with any philosophy or any class which practices or advocates open
defiance or studied and concerted disregard of the judgments of
the courts. We know better than anyone else that when the authority of the courts is destroyed, the last bulwark is destroyed and
constitutional government is wrecked and ended. In this situation
confronting the bench and bar of the country, it is ours to see that
assailants of our judicial system do not pass.
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